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THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION
CONTROL COUNCIL: ADVISE
OR COLLUDE?
WILLIAm H. RODGERS, JR.*
The process of lawmaking is often obscure, at times beyond the
ken of authorities such as courts and legislatures and even academic
researchers. On consumer and environmental issues, few sources of
legal authority are as influential as the advisory committee, particularly
the industry advisory committee, which only now is beginning to receive
the attention it deserves.1 Thousands of such committees function regu-
larly within the executive arm of the federal government. They give
advice, receive information, participate in the evolution of policy and
influence various federal administrators. The lawmaking function of
advisory committees is effectively immune from judicial review; even
worse, it is often beyond public scrutiny. The latter circumstance is
especially serious, since it is well recognized that a law created by only
a few and known to them only is unlikely to serve the interests of many.
The dominant industry advisory committee on environmental is-
sues in recent years has been the National Industrial Pollution Control
Council (NIPCC), established by Executive Order on April 9, 19702
"The new Council," declared the President, "will allow businessmen
to communicate regularly with the President, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality and other governmental officials and private organiza-
tions which are working to improve the quality of our environment."'
The Executive Order stressed the need for closely coordinated public
and private efforts on environmental issues: "The Council," the Presi-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., Harvard College, 1961; J.D.,
Columbia University, 1965. Some of the material used in this article will appear in a
book by the author, to be published in the fall of 1972 by Rodale Publishing Co. Research
on the article was completed in December of 1971. The author expresses appreciation to
members of the NIPCC staff who aided this research.
The author has served as an attorney, petitioner and plaintiff in various legal actions
concerning pollution from smelters, phosphorus in detergents and nonreturnable beverage
containers.
1 Hearings on Advisory Committees, Before Senate Subcomm. on Intergovernmental
Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings on Advisory Committees]; Hearings on Advisory
Committees, Before Senate Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
Hearings on Presidential Advisory Committees, Before House Special Studies Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. (1970); H. R.
Rep. No. 91-1731, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
2 Exec. Order No. 11523, 3 C.F.R. 915 (1966-70 Comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
3 Statement by the President on Establishing the National Industrial Pollution Con-
trol Council, April 9, 1970, 6 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 502 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Presidential Statement].
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dent explained, "will provide a means by which the business community
can help chart the route by which our cooperative ventures will fol-
low." 4 Named as Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, to help
chart the route were Mr. Bert S. Cross, Chairman of the Board of the
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company, and Mr. Willard F.
Rockwell, Jr., Chairman of the Board of the North American Rockwell
Corp. Joining them as members of the Council were fifty-three top
executives from the nation's leading industrial enterprises. Over two
hundred industry executives have served on NIPCC's thirty separate
sub-councils. Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans put it succinctly at
one NIPCC meeting: "Here is a very large part of the industrial might
of the country."5
NIPCC, as the President indicated, was to be charged with broad
responsibilities: (1) to provide a liaison among members of the business
and industrial community regarding environmental matters; and (2)
to offer advice on regulatory initiatives affecting the environment under-
taken by federal, state and local officials.6 That these business leaders
were to talk to one another as well as to their government was made
clear by Secretary Stans at a press conference announcing the formation
of the Council: "The total objective is to get the maximum input from
the business community in coordination with the Government's effort
to resolve the environmental problems and to urge the industries, [sic]
solicit their support in developing the technology required to eliminate
them. ' 17 Chairman Cross has opined that the Council gives business and
government "every opportunity to communicate with each other very
well.... [O]bviously some industries have done a better job than others
and I think that just being able to pass this technology back and forth
between the separate members is going to have a good effect."'
This article analyzes three aspects of NIPCC's performance: (1)
the promise and risks it has presented; (2) its procedural performance,
as tested by governing law; and (3) its accomplishments, both on the
record and sub rosa, as measured by the expectations. In brief, NIPCC
is portrayed as a dangerously anticompetitive institution occasionally
doing business in violation of the law. The Council has published both
public relations material and some useful data, but it has served more
importantly as a lobbying forum for industries chafing under the regu-
4 Id
5 See Summary Minutes, National Industrial Pollution Control Council (NIPCC)
Meeting, Feb. 10, 1971, at 3. A copy of these Minutes, and of those dted hereinafter in
the notes, may be obtained from the Central Reference and Records Inspection Facility,
Dep't of Commerce, Washington, D.C. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
6 See Presidential Statement, supra note 3, at 502.
7 Transcript of Press Conference of Maurice H. Stans, Secretary of Commerce, et
al., Office of White House Press Secretary, Apr. 9, 1970, at 2.
8 Id. at 4.
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latory bit. The experience of NIPCC forms the basis for section (4)
of this article, which offers recommendations designed to make more
responsive that potent fourth branch of government-the advisory com-
mittee. It is submitted that the emergence of the advisory committee
from the shadows of the administrative process is long overdue.
I. THE PROMISE AND RISKS OF NIPCC
A critical analysis of any governmental institution should start
with a consideration of its utility. An Administration considering
regulatory initiatives unavoidably and profoundly affecting the nation's
economy and industrial technology would be well advised to keep in-
formed regarding their likely consequences. In terms of potential, utility
to government regulators, no better consultants are available than
those from industries whose technology contributes to the degradation
of the environment. At present, no one is in a better position to do
something about environmental problems than the chief executive of-
ficers of such industries. So, too, it is impossible to quarrel with the
proposition that those who have a better way of doing business should
pass along their ideas to others not similarly inspired. That businessmen
should talk to each other and to their government about pollution is a
belief widely shared.
On the other hand, some kinds of talk are not always healthy. Mr.
Dooley, that venerable commentator on American life, expressed con-
cern about business leaders getting together with government officials:
"It seems to me that the on'y thing to do is to keep polyticians an'
businessmen apart. They seem to have a bad infloonce on each other.
Whiniver I see an aldherman an' a banker walkin' down the street to-
gether I know th' Recordin' Angel will have to ordher another bottle iv
ink."' And it was Adam Smith who said: "People of the same trade
seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the con-
versation ends in a conspiracy against the public.... Though the law
cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling to-
gether, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to
render them necessary."'"
The point is that antitrust issues loom large when competitors get
together to talk over their pollution problems. In United States v. Auto-
mobile Mfrs. Ass'n," for example, cooperation on pollution control in
the automobile industry led to a consent decree forbidding the manu-
facturers and their trade association from engaging in joint research
) Quoted in L. Kohlmeir, Jr., The Regulators 265 (1969).
10 A. Smith, Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations, Bk. I, ch. X, pt. 2 at 102 (4th ed.
1374) (Alex, Murray publisher).
11 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd sub nom., New York v. United States,
397 U.S. 248 (1970).
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and publicity, and forbidding common political strategies which would
influence administrators having the power to set standards. Similarly,
Richard McClaren, before his recent departure as head of the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, publicly discouraged joint environ-
mental research activities which are not clearly cost justified.12 He also
opposed coordinated informational submissions to administrative of-
ficials on environmental standards: "It is for this reason-i.e., to avoid
the risk that the group may be slowed down to the pace of the slowest
-that we urge that members of an industry present their views to
government agencies on questions of feasibility and timing on an in-
dividual, rather than on a joint, basis.' 13
The law governing the conduct of advisory committees is not un-
related to these fundamental concerns regarding the conspiratorial
abuse of governmental processes. Executive Order 11007, signed by
President Kennedy in 1962,14 grew out of extended deliberations con-
cerning the antitrust consequences of competitors getting together to
assist the government during the Korean War. 3 The question of
whether competitors meeting under the auspices of NIPCC have
scrupulously complied with this executive order serves as a useful legal
test for assessing the group's anticompetitive potential.
II. THE PROCEDURAL PERFORMANCE OF NIPCC
Executive Order 11007 attempts to avoid antitrust problems by
providing three procedural safeguards, concerning: (1) representation
within the relevant group; (2) public access to group deliberations; and
(3) governmental control of group meetings. Tested by these criteria,
the performance of NIPCC has been less than reassuring.
A. Representation
Executive Order 11007 defines an industry advisory committee as
an advisory group "composed predominantly of members or representa-
tives of a single industry or group of related industries, or of any
subdivision of a single industry made on a geographic, service or
product basis."'" The membership of an industry advisory committee
must be representative:
Each industry committee shall be reasonably representative of
12 Remarks of Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, before the Spring
Meeting of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, Apr. 9, 19709 at 9.
13 Id. at 8.
'4 3 C.F.R. 573 (1959-63 comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
15 For background in this area, see G. Lamb & C. Shields, Trade Association Law
and Practice 178-83 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as G. Lamb & C. Shields].
16 Exec. Order No. 11007 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 573 (1959-63 comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 901
(1970).
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the group of industries, the single industry, or the geograph-
ical, service, or product segment thereof to which it relates,
taking into account the size and function of business enter-
prises in the industry or industries, and their location, affilia-
tion and competitive status, among other factors. 7
One purpose of including all segments of an industry is to avoid giving
a competitive advantage to those having the good fortune of being con-
sulted about pending policy moves. Illustrative of potential industry
conflict over environmental issues is the debate concerning the wisdom
of retaining phosphorus in detergents-a matter which will be sub-
sequently discussed-where the decision to condemn one product ef-
fectively serves to condone another.
It is likely that the directive requiring a "reasonably representa-
tive" sample in an industry group has been violated in the administra-
tion of NIPCC. Selection of the members of the thirty sub-councils was
delegated to the big-business chairmen, who were advised only to
choose "no more than eight members" and to respect the size and
geographical distribution of firms in making their selection.' 8 In order
to avoid a clearly unlawful delegation of decision-making, sub-council
chairmen were cautioned "that governmental clearance is a prerequisite
for membership on a Sub-Council."' 9 Wholly apart from the question
of whether governmental rubber-stamping of the nominees of the sub-
council chairmen amounts to an independent judgment regarding what
is "reasonably representative," it is evident that the membership of
many sub-councils has not been representative. The big-business exec-
utive, it would appear, does not think immediately of small business
when he sits down to assign members to an industry advisory com-
mittee. For one example, among many, the Detergents Sub-Council,
chaired by Howard Morgens of the Procter & Gamble Co., included
the chief executive officers of the Lever Brothers Co., Armour Dial,
Avon Products, Inc., Colgate-Palmolive Co., Purex Corp., International
Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., and the Cagon Corp. 0 The list is hardly
overloaded with the midgets of the industry, a circumstance repeated
on the roster of virtually all the sub-councils.
The regular appearance of exclusively large corporate "observers"
at sub-council meetings reinforces the negative impression concerning
the representative nature of the groups. Observers at the Electric and
Nuclear Sub-Council included two representatives from Westinghouse,
'7 Id. § 5.
18 Summary Minutes, NIPCC Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970, at 2.
19 Id.
20 For a roster of the members of the sub-council, see News Release, July 14, 1970,
United States Dep't of Commerce News, G 70-88, at 6.
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one from General Electric and another from the Radio Corporation of
America (RCA) .21 Observers at a meeting of the Sub-Council on Dairy,
Fish and Other Foods included representatives of CPC International,
General Foods Corp., Campbell Soup Co., Kraft Corp., Nestle, Del
Monte Corp., and Booth Fisheries.22 Sitting in with the Sub-Council on
Grain-Based Food Products were observers from the Pillsbury Co. and
General Mills, Inc.3 No elaborate analysis of the respective market
shares of these NIPCC members is necessary to reinforce the suspicion
that small business interests have not been big enough to be included in
the Council's deliberations.
B. Public Access to NIPCC Deliberations
A time-tested technique for discouraging meetings of competitors
from becoming conspiracies against the public is to record fully the
deliberations of the group. Decades ago Milton Handler urged that
trade associations should be required to keep and to make available to
the public "a complete stenographic record of their proceedings at all
regular and special meetings."24 The registration of trade associations
and the disclosure of their activities was recommended by the
Temporary National Economic Committee in 1941.25 In the early
1950's, the Justice Department distributed to government agencies
"suggested standards" for minimizing the antitrust risks surrounding
advisory committees, including a recommendation for public access to
the complete minutes of each meeting2
In similar fashion, Executive Order 11007 initially declares that
"[a] verbatim transcript shall be kept of all proceedings at each meet-
ing of an industry advisory committee .... 2 7 But a proviso allows a
waiver of this obligation and alternatively permits the keeping of sum-
mary minutes if the head of a department "formally determines" that a
verbatim transcript "would interfere with the proper functioning of such
a committee or would be impracticable, and that [a] waiver of the
21 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Electric and Nuclear Sub-
Council Meeting, June 30, 1970, at 1.
22 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Dairy, Fish and Other Foods
Sub-Council Meeting, June 26, 1970, at 2.
23 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Sub-Council on Grain-Based
Food Products Meeting, June 23, 1970, at 1.
24 Handler, A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of Federal Antitrust
Laws 93 (Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 38, 1941).
25 Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee, Investigation and Concentration of Economic Power, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong.,
3d Sess. 38 (1941).
26 See G. Lamb & C. Shields, supra note 15, at 179-80.
27 Section 6(d), 3 C.FXR 574-75 (1959-63 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
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requirement of a verbatim transcript [would be] in the public in-
terest .... 128
Predictably, industry spokesmen have indicated that the public
interest demands excluding the public from NIPCC deliberations. A
need to encourage candor and open discussion has been proffered as the
justification for this secrecy. Walter Hamilton, NIPCC's Executive
Secretary, so indicated in response to a query from Senator Lee Metcalf,
during recent Senate hearings:
It has been my own observation many, many times over my
own career that the larger the group, the less the commonality
and background between the people, the more people there
are in a room or around the table, the more record in detail of
what is said that is required, the less effective the exchanges.
*.. This is not because they have anything to hide, but be-
cause those present in the meeting in small groups are able to
understand each other and talk in what amounts often to a
kind of shorthand. They do not have to spell everything out.29
NIPCC Chairman Cross has offered this defense of the special kind of
"shorthand" spoken at industry advisory committee meetings:
There is often a vast difference between the sense of a frank
exchange and the exact words used. Verbatim transcripts
would not be an effective or accurate account of meetings such
as those of our council and subcouncils because they would not
reflect the commonality of experience and knowledge assumed
between those engaged in the discussions. If everything had to
be spelled out for the benefit of the vebatim transcript, the
freedom and the effectiveness of the often rapid-fire types of
exchange in which we now engage would be impaired. The ef-
fect would be similar to that if open meetings were required. 0
The highly dubious contention that the "proper functioning" of
the NIPCC deliberations depends upon the participants speaking "off
the record" is a principal reason for NIPCC's loss of credibility. The
claim that small industry groups and behind-the-scenes meetings are
essential to facilitate candid discussions is an apologia of general utility,
intended to explain the waiver of verbatim transcripts as being "in the
public interest." One wonders why any advice offered to the govern-
ment, if worthwhile, is not worthy of being placed in the public
28 Id.
29 1971 Hearings on Advisory Committees, supra note 1, at 413.
30 Id. at 406-07.
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record. Mr. Cross' further contention that a verbatim transcript of
meetings would not provide an "effective or accurate account" is pure
nonsense, and fails to explain why something less than a verbatim
transcript would be any more accurate. There may be some merit to
Mr. Hamilton's concern for maintaining the integrity of free exchange
within a small group, especially among those unskilled at on-the-record
communications. But the public's need to know should prevail over
any concern regarding the participants' privacy, especially those who
represent "a very large part of the industrial might of the country."
In the case of NIPCC, the "free exchange" principle appears to be
offered primarily to still congressional inquisitors: the March 8, 1971,
meeting of the Mining and Non-Ferrous Metals Sub-Council, for ex-
ample, brought together a group of sundry members, observers and
government officials numbering fifty-nine."' Oddly enough, in this
"small group" there was no room for representatives of the public.
There is yet another reason to question a decision to waive verba-
tim transcripts. As early as 1951, the Justice Department took the posi-
tion that trade association executives should not participate in the
'work of industry advisory committees,3" although Executive Order
11007 is silent on the question. The rationale was that the "coordina-
tion" of advice and exchanges of information through persons so close
to industry-wide policy-making might easily become conspiratorial.
The meetings of NIPCC have proceeded unencumbered by this Justice
Department advice and, it would seem, totally unaware of it. Various
sub-council meetings have been attended by observers from the Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute,3 3 the American Institute of Merchant Ship-
ping,34 the American Meat Institute, the National Independent Meat
Packers Association, the National Renderers Association,"5 the Rubber
Manufacturers Association, 0 the Western Wood Products Association,
the Southern Forest Products Association, the Southwest Forest Indus-
tries, the National Forest Products Association, 7 the American Min-
31 See roster of those in attendance. Summary Minutes, Mining and Non-Ferrous
Metals Sub-Council Meeting, Mar. 8, 1971, at i-ii.
32 See G. Lamb & C. Shields, supra note 15, at 178-80.
33 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Sub-Council on Petroleum and
Gas Meeting, July 7, 1970, at 1.
34 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Sub-Council on Shipping
Meeting, July 10, 1970, at 2.
S5 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Poultry and Animal-Based
Food Products Sub-Council Meeting, Sept. 29, 1970, at 1.
36 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Sub-Council on Rubber Meet-
ing, Sept. 23, 1970, at 1.
87 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Sub-Council on Wood Products
Meeting, Sept. 18, 1970, at 1.
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ing Congress,3" the Soap & Detergent Association, 0 and the National
Canners Association." One might ask what type of information it is
that can be freely shared among such industry members and trade
association officials but which cannot be made available to the public.
Somewhat inconsistently, NIPCC spokesmen have defended the
closed meeting procedure on the alternative ground that an adequate
public record has been provided in any case: in the event of a waiver
of a verbatim transcript, the law requires "in lieu thereof" the "keeping
of minutes which shall, as a minimum, contain a record of persons
present, a description of matters discussed, and copies of all reports
received, issued, or approved by the committee."41 The minutes must
be certified as accurate by a full-time salaried officer of the government,
present during the proceedings recorded.42 They are available under
the Freedom of Information Act4" to anyone wishing to spend twenty-
five cents per page.
The value of the available information is another matter. An
investment of $128.50 will pay for the committee-meeting minutes of
approximately the first six months of the deliberations of NIPCC and
its sub-councils.4 The minutes amount to a skeletal outline of the
issues discussed, evidently thoroughly sanitized. The practice" of the
NIPCC staff has been to circulate draft summaries of the minutes to
members of the sub-councils, who are invited to make editorial changes,
with the consequence that all damaging, and some useful, information
has disappeared from the public record. The final versions of the min-
utes have thus been thoroughly diluted, whether accurate or not.
The requirement that the minutes contain "copies of all reports
received, issued, or approved by the committee" has also been violated
occasionally. The Summary Minutes of the Meeting of the Sub-Council
on Wood Products46 disclose that the members received a Boise Cascade
38 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Mining and Non-Ferrous
Metals Sub-Council Meeting, Mar. 8, 1971, at 1.
39 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Detergents Sub-Council Meet-
ing, Aug. 27, 1970 at 1.
40 See roster of observers present. Summary Minutes, Dairy, Fish and Other Foods,
Sub-Council Meeting, Aug. 11, 1970, at 1.
41 Exec. Order No. 11007 § 6(d), 3 C.F.R. 574-75 (1959-63 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 901
(1970).
42 Id. § 6(c).
43 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
44 See letter from author to Ruth M. Smyser, Central Reference & Records Inspec-
tion Facility, Department of Commerce, dated Dec. 3, 1970. A copy of the letter is on
file in the office of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
45 Based on the author's personal conversations with NIPCC staff members, on
several different occasions.
48 Sept. 18, 1970, at 6.
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report entitled "Forest Management-Soil Erosion." A request for the
report from the company drew this response from R. Kirk Ewart,
Assistant to the Vice President:
I prepared this paper for use by Mr. R. V. Hansberger, Presi-
dent of Boise Cascade in his capacity as a member of the
President's Council on Environmental Quality. This paper
may be included in the report of the Forest Industry section
of the aforementioned Council. I do not feel it would be pru-
dent to release my work prior to the Council's report. Upon
release of the Council's report, this work will be generally
available.47
Enough appears in the summary minutes to disclose that the
information flowing to the sub-council members from the government
has made their participation worthwhile. A thorough briefing on pend-
ing federal research projects is a customary courtesy, 8 offering the
distinct advantage of insider's information to the participants. The
NIPCC meetings, especially those of the full Council, often have been
attended by a regalia of top officials with policy-making responsibilities
on environmental issues.49 NIPCC members have been kept fully in-
formed of the thinking of the government regulators, the data available
to them, gaps in their information, and questions they might have to
confront.5
Of course no serious objection can be made to governmental
briefing of industry representatives on the status of federal research, or
to disclosing other information having the potential of being translated
into regulatory initiatives. Knowledge of what our government is doing
is a fundamental principle of freedom of information. A sounder objec-
tion against the special informational service provided to NIPCC may,
however, be directed at the fact that the information is unavailable to
all. Barriers of cost, time, convenience and access mean that only a
select few are offered a full explanation of current regulatory thinking.
In addition, information about pending governmental moves is a one-
way street-the public and the government have no legal claim to in-
formation regarding pending industry or trade association initiatives
on pollution issues. NIPCC's waiver of a verbatim transcript makes it
impossible to assess fully the significance of the disparity in information
which the institution perpetuates. But as any lawyer knows, inviting
47 See letter to author, Apr. 8, 1971 (emphasis added). A copy of the letter is on
file in the office of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
48 See, e.g., Summary Minutes, NIPCC Meeting, Oct. 14, 1971, at 3-8.
49 Id. at 2.
50 Id. at 3-8.
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one side to talk to the judge behind closed doors is a questionable route
to a healthy decision.
C. Government Control of Policy Decisions
Clearly, no advisory committee should take over the role of the
government decision-maker. Government control over the agenda and
retention of the power to adjourn meetings and prepare summary min-
utes are supposed to ensure against undue influence by an advisory
committee. "Unless specifically authorized by law.. ." declares Execu-
tive Order 11007, "no committee shall be utilized for functions not
solely advisory, and determinations of action to be taken with respect
to matters upon which an advisory committee advises or recommends
shall be made solely by officers or employees of the Government.""Cl
Handing over governmental powers to private persons is an indiscretion
not lightly undertaken. How NIPCC has made use of its advisors from
key industries and, conversely, how these advisors have used NIPCC
to effect changes in federal environmental policy are issues which re-
quire a closer examination of the Council's work-product.
III. NIPCC's AcCOMPLISHMMNTS:
THE FoR AND THE SUBSTANCE
A. The Formal Record
On more than one occasion NIPCC has been accused of being a
bold public relations effort, designed to achieve a government-sponsored
whitewashing of industry's role as a polluter.52 In support of this theory,
Senator Lee Metcalf published in hearings of the Subcommittee on
Intergovernmental Relations a document distributed to "NIPCC-public
relations contacts" by Mr. Tom Cunning, NIPCC's Director of Com-
munications and Public Affairs.e Cunning pointed out that at the open-
ing Council meeting on October 14, 1970, "the need for industry and
NIPCC to get going on a 'communications-P.R.' program was men-
tioned time and time again."54 "As you know," wrote Cunning, "the
P.R. aspects of industry and pollution and what industry is doing is a
tough nut to crack. It's not that industry generally isn't doing something
and making progress, it's how do we get the story told considering the
attitude of the public."5 Cunning explained that he was preparing a(case history" series that would provide "results ... [and] facts...
51 Section 4, 3 C.F.R. 574 (1959-63 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
52 Hearings on Advisory Committees, Before Senate Subcomm. on Intergovernmental
Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 353-54
(1971).
53 Id. at 422-23.
54 Remarks of Mr. Cunning are set forth in id. at 422.
U5 Id.
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show [ing] that industry is doing something.""0 His plea for cooperation
from industry's communications experts was met with a blizzard of
material.
The strongest supporter of NIPCC would not deny that public
relations has been an important part of the Council's endeavors. The
"case history" series recommended by Mr. Cunning has been pub-
lished, 7 and its content consists largely of a number of reprints from
house organs and planted news stories, all trumpeting the accomplish-
ments of NIPCC members. Although edited for taste, the tone in the
following typical statements is unmistakable:"' "Healthy cattle grazing
on a Tennessee hillside and flawless peaches ripening in a Washington
orchard seem at first glance to have little to do with aluminum smelting
and fabrication"; "Texaco's Giant Step"; "GF is Praised for Pollution
Control"; "Boise Cascade Transforms Long Beach Refuse Site Into
Mobilehome Community"; "Cash-for-Cans Program Moves." And on
it goes. Though pride in one's accomplishments is not without its place,
it can be said that the promise of NIPCC has not been brought to
fruition by the public relations experts.
Another major NIPCC publication, entitled "Commitments of
Industry Pollution Cleanup Actions in Progress," 59 was designed to
demonstrate what the Council members have accomplished and to offer
good examples for others. "We need to give direct and specific evidence
that the members of the Council and its Sub-Councils take the Presi-
dent's charge personally and seriously.. ."0 was the message to NIPCC
members from Staff Director Walter Hamilton. "The more complex
issues must still be addressed, but this evidence of action can make an
important difference in public attitudes in the coming year.""'
The Commitments document is useful and contains instructive in-
formation regarding scores of unpublicized industry undertakings in-
tended to curb or eliminate environmental degradation. For lawyers
who are inclined to equate progress with the number of suits filed, the
document lends perspective by identifying a range of initiatives avail-
able to innovative businesses. Public appreciation is owed to a company
56 Id.
57 The "case history" is entitled CASEBOOK: Pollution Cleanup Actions (Feb. 10,
1971).
5S Unfortunately, the pages in the CASEBOOK are not numbered. The quotes
which follow in the text are derived principally from the titles of the individual
histories.
59 Published in Feb. 1971. At the NIPCC meeting on Oct. 14, 1971, Mr. Hamilton
announced that the Council would issue a periodic report entitled Industry In Action.
See Report of the Executive Director, reproduced in the Summary Minutes, NIPCC
Meeting, Oct. 14, 1971.
60 Undated letter sent to all NIPCC members, reproduced in Commitments publlca-
tion, at 2.
61 Id. at 3.
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that undertakes voluntarily to replace the high phosphate detergents
used in dining areas; or to recycle tires on company vehicles; or to
find out where the waste hauler disposes of liquid wastes; or to insist
upon recycling of the aluminum foil used in the packaging of frozen
foods; or to conduct ecological surveys at all plants; or to use low-
leaded gasoline in company vehicles. Commendable, too, are the few
corporations which pledge to combat air and water pollution "to the
extent that such prevention is technically feasible."6, Also praise-
worthy are industry promises of specific commitments, even though
they are often heavily qualified or the product of legal compulsion,
especially in view of the often-changing regulatory patterns affecting
many industries. It was the Consolidation Coal Co., for example, which
unqualifiedly represented that by the end of 1975 "mine drainage pro-
duced in and pumped from our active operations will be under con-
trol." 3 The Commitments publication makes clear that there exists a
broad range of useful initiatives which can be undertaken by a con-
cerned management; it is for this reason that the NIPCC theme of
volunteerism should not be dismissed summarily.
The most significant publications of NIPCC are a series of short
sub-council reports discussing the pollution problems of various in-
dustries. 4 Of uneven quality, these tracts set forth an industry's posi-
tion with supporting data."; The reports are useful both as public
relations documents and as a shorthand consolidation of an industry's
position. Several provide informative, though abbreviated, nontechnical
summaries of the major pollution problems confronting an industry.
Illustrative of the sub-council reports are the following. The Air-
lines and Aircraft Sub-Council provides a depressing analysis of noise
technology:
62 Letter to Walter Hamilton from W.E. Callahan, International Harvester Co.,
Dec. 13, 1970, reproduced in Commitments publication.
63 Letter to Walter Hamilton from John Corcoran, President, Consolidation Coal Co.,
Jan. 8, 1971, reproduced in Commitments publication.
04 Over 40 of these reports are anticipated. As of October 1971, 31 had been pub-
lished. Among them are those entitled Detergents, Junk Car Disposal, Mercury, Acid
Mine Drainage, Air Pollution by Sulfur Oxides, Animal Dumping of Baled Refuse,
Exhaust Emissions from Gas Turbine Engines, Glass Containers, Mathematical Models
for Air Pollution Control Policy Decision-Making, Noise From Gas Turbine Aircraft
Engines, Regionally Consolidated Industrial Wastewater Treatment, Self-Analysis of
Pollution Problems, Waste Disposal in Deep Wells, Wood Products, Detergents (A Status
Report), The Engineer's Responsibility in Environmental Pollution Control, Maintaining
Vehicular Emission Control System Integrity, Paper, Plastics in Solid Waste, Wastewater
Reclamation, Leisure Time Product Noise, Pollution Problems in Selected Food In-
dustries (excludes Meat, Poultry and Grain-Based Foods), The Chemical Industry and
Pollution Control, The Disposal of Major Appliances, An Evaluation of the Appliance
X-Ray Pollution Problem, The Use and Disposal of Electrical Insulating Liquids, The
Electric Power Industry, Fertilizers & Agricultural Chemicals, and Rubber.
65 Based on the author's personal conversations with NIPCC staff members.
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A point currently has been reached where no immediate
breakthroughs are foreseen and it is anticipated that further
noise reductions will be achieved only in small increments.
Despite the progress made to date in reducing noise levels,
aircraft will still be judged as noisy by those who live or
work in close proximity to airport flight paths."
As regards air pollution, another report of the same sub-council indi-
cates that "[f]urther reduction of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide
will be difficult."6 The report of the Glass and Plastic Containers Sub-
Council indicates few industry problems: "Because of their inertness,
plastics make a suitable component for landfill. Plastics can be inciner-
ated with few complications even in present substandard equipment if
properly operated." 68 As to the future, "the plastics industry believes
that for the next ten to twenty years the most widely used means for
solid waste management will be sanitary landfill and incineration." 0
The Coal Sub-Council views acid mine drainage as a problem, but not
one that can be solved by the coal industry alone: "If the acid mine
drainage problem is ever to be solved, responsibility for control and/or
treatment of such discharges from non-operating and abandoned mines
must rest with the public. Large sums must be appropriated by govern-
mental bodies for this purpose.170 A "minor problem" 7' making up only
one percent of the country's solid waste, reports another sub-council,
is the disposal of the 350 million major appliances now in use-63
million refrigerators, more than 63 million ranges, nearly 63 million
water heaters, 58 million washers, 25 million dryers, 25 million air
conditioners, 18 million freezers, 16 million dishwashers and 14 million
garbage disposals.7' The Sub-Council on Leisure also reports that,
compared to other noise makers, motorcycles, snowmobiles, chain saws
and rotary power mowers are "not a very serious problem.7 3
Not surprisingly, the NIPCC sub-council tracts generally contain
the type of information found in trade association publications. Usually,
each offers a common definition of the problem, together with a brief
description of research programs under way, and recommendations for
00 Airlines and Aircraft Sub-Council Report, Noise From Gas Turbine Aircraft
Engines, Feb. 1971, at 23.
67 Airlines and Aircraft Sub-Council Report, Exhaust Emissions From Gas Turbine
Air Engines, Feb. 1971, at 26.
08 Glass and Plastic Containers Sub-Council Report, Plastics in Solid Waste, Mar.
1971, at 17.
09 Id. at 16.
70 Coal Sub-Council Report, Acid Mine Drainage, Feb. 1971, at 6.
71 Electric and Nuclear Sub-Council Report, The Disposal of Major Appliances, June
1971, at 13.
72 Id. at 7.
73 Leisure Sub-Council Report, Leisure Time Product Noise, May 1971, at 6.
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future action. In a sense, the publications are anticompetitive since
they offer joint positions on common regulatory and research problems.
But standing alone they certainly are not dangerous enough to be viola-
tive of the antitrust laws. Overall, it could be said that the store of
knowledge concerning industry's pollution problems is enhanced by the
NIPCC publications.
NIPCC has also engaged in other activities worthy of mention.
Periodic reports have been made to the President. The report of Febru-
ary 10, 1971,1 took a stand against "permanent subsidies" for pollution
control, stressed the need for international accords, opposed a system
to sell rights to pollute the environment, and urged that controls be
based on evidence showing a reasonable likelihood of harm to man
and his environment. NIPCC has also established a panel of technical
representatives from industry, to be available to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) on an "on call" basis.7 5 As explained by
NIPCC staff member Thomas W. Jackson, "[w]herever possible the
technical personnel should encourage submission of testimony in order
to prevent the Government from making decisions without technical
input from industry.
'76
One is left, however, with an abiding conviction that the formally
acknowledged activities of NIPCC fail to tell the whole story. There
exists some doubt as to whether a few pamphlets, which could have
been compiled by the public relations staffs of the corporations rep-
resented on NIPCC, reflect the principal performance of the institution.
Top corporate executives, though they may spend time writing tracts
if the President asks them to, are more familiar with major policy
decision-making. The impact of NIPCC on policy matters cannot be
assessed by reviewing the publications; rather, it can be determined
only by looking beyond the formal record.
B. The Sub Rosa Record
At the sixth meeting of the Council on October 14, 1971, Secretary
Stans candidly acknowledged that the Council had become "an effective
new institutional communication and leadership link for industry and
Government. 77 He stated to the Council members: "You have played
an increasingly important role in both Government policy-making and
74 The National Industrial Pollution Control Council Report to the President, BNA
Env. L. Rep., Current Devs. 1103 (Feb. 12, 1971).
75 Letter to William Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), from Walter Hamilton, undated. A copy is on file in the office of the Boston
College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
76 Memo from Thomas Jackson to NIPCC-Technical Representatives, June 11, 1971.
A copy is on file in the office of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law
Review.
77 Opening Remarks of Secretary Maurice H. Stans, reprinted in Summary Minutes,
National Industrial Pollution Control Council, Oct. 14, 1971, at 1.
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in industry leadership .... Virtually no major move is made in en-
vironmental policy without drawing on your advice and criticism. The
rough spots in [the] administration of environmental laws, standards
and implementation actions have been easier to spot and smooth out
because you are always available to give us help."" In an effort to
assess the role of NIPCC, the two following cases are offered as sug-
gestive, if not paradigmatic, of the manner in which the advisory com-
mittee serves as policy maker. The extent to which industry has
- "smoothed out the rough spots" in national environmental policy makes
clear that the advisory committee is a lawmaker to be reckoned with.
1. The Non-Ferrous Smelters
Early in 1970, as NIPCC was created by order of the President,
the smelting industry was locked in a bitter controversy with several
western states. The latter had moved to impose emission standards on
smelters by calling for control of ninety percent of the sulfur dioxide
released by process weight.79 Based in part on a document prepared by
Mr. Terry Stumph of the National Air Pollution Control Administra-
tion (NAPCA), Division of Process Control Engineering," the states
of Washington, Utah, Montana and Arizona were moving to impose
emission standards thought to be technologically and economically un-
feasible by the smelter operators. 1 Industry's counter-attack in mid-
1970, coordinated by the American Mining Congress, included a letter
to NAPCA Commissioner John Middleton, demanding that he repudiate
the Stumph document and communicate that message forthwith to
those states acting in reliance upon the document.82 Industry argued
at one point that NAPCA was attempting illegally to establish emis-
sion standards.3
The Mining and Non-Ferrous Metals Sub-Council of NIPCC
served as a convenient focal point for bringing industry pressure to bear
on the ninety percent standard. The Sub-Council's first meeting was
held in Washington, D.C., on July 6, 1970. The highlight of the session
was the distribution of a blistering talk by Frank Milliken of the Ken-
necott Copper Corporation: 84
In government's development of criteria and the subsequent
78 Id.
79 For a brief discussion of this controversy (which is still continuing), see New
York Times, Feb. 7, 1972, at 24, col. 3.
80 The original draft of the paper, entitled Proposed Emission Standard for Reduced
Sulfur from Primary Non-Ferrous Smelters, was published in Nov. 1969.
81 See note 79 supra.
82 Letter from J. Allen Overton, Executive Vice-President, American Mining Congress,
to John Middleton, June 30, 1970. A copy of the letter is on file in the office of the
Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
83 Id.
84 Set forth in an appendix to Summary Minutes, July 6, 1970.
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setting of standards... the testimony and data presented by
industry have not received due consideration by government
.... And in the present critical stage of action-the planning
and implementation of quality control measures-govern-
ment must grant us a fair and honest forum .... Many ele-
ments of the Federal bureaucracy show every sign that they
endorse precipitous actions often based on inappropriate or
incomplete research data, set ill-defined objectives or over-
simplify complex problems ....
Yet our own experience, particularly that involving smelter
emissions in the [w] estern United States, does not show the
HEW research data to be relevant ....
Imposition of uniform but unnecessarily severe ambient air
standards across the country can place an undue economic
burden on industry. But when emission standards place re-
strictions on industry that are even more repressive than the
ambient air standards-and are even less necessary-the re-
sulting economic impact on industry is serious enough so that
it might lead to the shutting down of smelters."8
Milliken supported his shut-down talk with a few cost figures-a
$180 million investment would be required to recover seventy percent
of the sulfur, and an additional $150 million to achieve ninety percent
control."6 Replacement of existing smelters, he observed, would cost
"billions."81
Apparently inspired by Milliken's remarks, the Sub-Council dic-
tated a series of "recommendations" into the summary minutes, indicat-
ing that it was seriously dissatisfied with the role played by NAPCA in
the standard-setting process at the state and regional level. NAPCA's
use of an "unofficial paper"S was singled out for criticism; submission
of the Stumph Report "as part of NAPCA testimony at state hearings
[had, in the Sub-Council's view,] lent an entirely unjustified but au-
thoritative significance to it." 9 The Sub-Council further resolved that
"the use of this paper as the basis for establishing standards for sulphur
dioxide should be discontinued, and that the states who have received
8r Id. at 2-6 (emphasis in original).
86 Id. at 7.
87 Id.
88 Suggested Emission Limits for Equivalent Sulfur from Existing Primary Non-
ferrous Smelters, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Environmental Health
Service, National Air Pollution Control Administration (rev. ed. Aug., 1970).
89 See Summary Minutes, Sub-Council on Mining and Non-Ferrous Metals Meeting,
July 6, 1970, at 7.
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it should be informed that it does not reflect the official position of
NAPCA., 90
By September, 1970, the strategy for killing the ninety percent
standard had matured. On September 24, the Mining and Non-Ferrous
Metals Sub-Council of NIPCC again met in Washington to consider,
among other agenda items, NAPCA's use of the Stumph Report. The
minutes of that meeting disclose a new strategy involving industry
research and development: industry would now search for facts to
support its position. One study, to be conducted at the University of
Utah, was to focus on the health effects of atmospheric sulfur dioxide
(SO 2 ) from smelters.91 The Smelter Control Research Association was
to be formed to demonstrate, on a pilot plant scale, "the technical and
economical feasibility of at least one method of SO2 removal from
smelter stack emissions.1112 This tardy joint research effort caused some
surprise because, as Kennecott's Milliken explained in July of 1970,
"[e]nvironmental quality control measures [at smelters] have to be
integrated into individual processes and have to be tailored to a variety
of factors peculiar to each operation and each locale in which we
operate. ' 3 The types of concentrates and metallurgical processes, in
particular, supposedly make the problems of each smelter different.
None of the big four (Kennecott, Anaconda, Phelps Dodge, and Amer-
ican Smelting & Refining Co.) lacked funds for individual research,
and all, in fact, were engaged individually in sulfur dioxide research
(ASARCO, with Phelps Dodge, now has a pilot plant under construc-
tion). One is left with the impression that the Smelter Control Research
Association has the potential only for demonstrating that it is not
technically and economically feasible to remove sulfur dioxide from
smelter stack emissions.
The most important meeting of NIPCC's Mining and Non-Ferrous
Metals Sub-Council took place on March 8, 1971. In attendance were
two members of the Sub-Council, four NIPCC staff members and fifty-
three observers, including members of the American Mining Congress
Presentation Group and federal government invitees. The chief execu-
tives of the major producers served up a carefully coordinated perfor-
mance aiming, once and for all, to kill the ninety percent emission
standard then in effect in several states. Kennecott's Chairman of the
Board, Frank Milliken, opened the meeting with a general discussion
of problems faced by the non-ferrous metal smelting industry, particu-
larly the copper industry. He stressed concern for foreign competition:
90 Id. at 8.
91 See Summary Minutes, Mining and Non-Ferrous Metal Sub-Council Meeting,
Sept. 24, 1970, at 5.
92 Id.
93 Appendix to Summary Minutes, July 6, 1970, at 8.
736
THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION CONTROL COUNCIL
"U.S. security interests require U.S. capability to counter foreign
threats of lowered production and high prices. 9 4 Kennecott's David
Swan then took over to explain "the magnitude of the disparity between
these government [cost] figures [of $87 million]95 and the figures
arrived at in an independent study96 made by the reputable engineering
organization of Fluor Corporation." 97 The capital costs necessary to
meet a ninety percent curtailment of sulfur dioxide emissions were
estimated to range from $345 million to $1200 million, with the latter
figure involving complete plant replacement. For those who missed the
occasion, Mr. Swan's remarks were later published in the Mining Con-
gress Journal.95
In addition to overwhelming NAPCA's existing cost data by a
factor of ten, this "independent" Fluor study, as interpreted by Mr.
Swan, offered other insights: "Available technology does not permit
achieving both ambient and 90 percent emission control within the
time allowed by the 1970 Clean Air Act .... Emission control of 90
percent is very costly. At present, methods of achieving this limitation
are not known. New smelters or radical re-design of plants would be
required to meet the 90 percent control limits."99 Mr. Swan concluded
by offering these suggestions: (1) the 90 percent emission requirements
should and could be eliminated; (2) efforts to establish reliable data on
health effects particularly in smelter environments should be identified;
and (3) the proposed national secondary ambient air standards should
be reviewed and revised downward.100
Speaker after speaker from these supposed competitors passed the
identical word: drop the ninety percent standard. Closing the lengthy
presentation was ASARCO's Charles Barber: "If my remarks sound
more urgent than those of some of the others who have spoken this
morning, it is because the problems facing American Smelting and
Refining Company are more urgent .... [For us,] it is a matter of
survival .... We urge that APCO's [Air Pollution Control Office of
EPA] sponsorship of the arbitrary 90 percent sulfur emission standard
94 Summary Minutes, Mining and Non-Ferrous Metals Sub-Council Meeting, Mar. 8,
1971, at 1.
95 Report to the Congress, The Economics of Clean Air, S. Doc. No. 92-6, 92d Cong.,
1st. Sess. 4-19, (1971); see S. Doc. No. 91-65, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970).
96 The report is Fluor Utah Engineers & Constructors, Inc., The Impact of Air
Pollution Abatement on the Copper Industry, Apr. 20, 1971.
97 Swan's remarks were reprinted in Swan, Study of Costs for Complying with
Standards for Control of Sulfur Oxide Emissions from Smelters, Mining Cong. J. at 85
(Apr. 1971).
98 Id. at 76.
99 Id. at 84.
100 Id. at 85.
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be withdrawn and discontinued." 10 1 Speaking as one, the entire industry
painted a picture of doom for the United States' non-ferrous smelting
capacity and laid the blame squarely on the ninety percent standard.
The strength of the submission came in part from the unanimity of its
proponents.
On April 7, 1971, after the March 8 NIPCC presentation at the
Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency pub-
lished proposed federal guidelines for the states to follow in their
preparation of implementation plans necessary to achieve the ambient
standards.&0 2 The guidelines marked the last appearance, under federal
sponsorship, of the ninety percent standard for copper smelters. In-
cluded in the appendix to this document were "examples of emission
limitations and other measures directly applicable or adaptable to
point sources and area sources .... Although these emission limitations
contained herein are relatively stringent, they have, with some modifica-
tion, been applied by various State and local jurisdictions."'10 3 Under
the heading "Non-Ferrous Smelters" was a formula for the emission
control of copper, lead and zinc smelters, accompanied by an explana-
tory note: "This rule, in effect, requires removal of about 90 percent
of the input-sulfur to the smelter."'01 °
On August 14, in the final version of the guidelines, the same
formula was published' 5 with a different explanation:
These emission limitations are equivalent to removal of
about 90 percent of the input-sulfur to the smelter for most
copper smelters and somewhat higher for most lead and zinc
smelters. Technology capable of achieving such emission
limitations may not be applicable to all existing smelters. In
such cases, less restrictive control can be coupled with re-
stricted operations to achieve air quality standards.'
Who decreed the change in the standard, and why, are matters of
speculation. No NIPCC minutes supply the evidence. It appears, how-
ever, that the Mining and Non-Ferrous Metals Sub-Council was a
principal contributor of ex parte information on the technical and
economic aspects of a significant federal policy. It seems clear, too,
that the strength of this information in part depended upon a number
of competitors joining hands in what amounted to a united political
101 Attachment VIII to Summary Minutes, Mining and Non-Ferrous Metals Sub-
Council Meeting, Mar. 8, 1971, at 1, 5.
102 36 Fed. Reg. 6680 (Apr. 10, 1971).
103 Id. at 6683, 6687.
104 Id. (emphasis added).
105 36 Fed. Reg. 15486 (Aug. 14, 1971).
1o Id. at 15496.
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front. Secretary Stans stated on October 14, 1971: "EPA and industry
estimates of cost increases attributable to control of sulphur oxide
emissions, for example, were an order of magnitude apart. It has taken
a great deal of work by both sides over the past year to get closer
agreement on this one item in the smelter industry.' 10 7 It is also ap-
parent that NIPCC had provided an opportunity for industry spokes-
men to discuss and refine a joint-research strategy aimed at developing
new technologies. Fostering conspiracy had become a conscious govern-
ment policy.
2. The Detergent Makers
Like the smelter operators, detergent manufacturers were engaged
in intense regulatory struggles early in 1970, when NIPCC was estab-
lished. The principal problem concerned the phosphorus in detergents,
which had been identified as a major factor in the process of eutrophica-
tion in many bodies of water. This process is typified by excessive algae,
oxygen depletion and a reduction in the water's beneficial uses." 8 The
new cry against detergents as water polluters inspired numerous local
regulations designed to control phosphorus content,109 various com-
plaints against advertising filed with the Federal Communications Com-
mission," and a proposed warning label and ingredients statement
recommended by the Federal Trade Commission."' In February, 1970,
federal water pollution officials of the Joint Industry-Government Task
Force on Eutrophication, which had been studying the problem since
late in 1967, publicly indicated their belief that the detergent industry
was reneging on its commitment to eliminate phosphorus from deter-
gents.1
12
The ground lost by industry within the Joint Task Force was soon
made up within NIPCC. Although the Detergents Sub-Council did not
clearly emerge as a major influence, it served as a useful forum for
107 Pollution Control Costs and Phase II of the New Economic Program, appendix
to Summary Minutes, NIPCC Meeting, Oct. 14, 1971.
lo8 Hearings on Phosphates in Detergents and the Eutrophication of America's
Waters, Before the House Conservation and Natural Resources Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Governmental Operations, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. passim (1969).
109 See, e.g., Chicago Municipal Code §§ 17-7.1 to -7.4 (1970); Detroit Code ch. 5,
art. 5 (1971); and Akron, Ohio, Code ch. 753 (1970).
110 See, e.g., the reply of The Federal Communications Commission (June 28, 1971)
to complaints filed against licensees who broadcast phosphate commercials. A copy of the
reply is on file in the office of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Re-
view.
Ill See release of the Federal Trade Commission inviting comment on its proposed
trade regulation rule concerning labeling and advertising requirements for detergents,
"Notice of Public Hearing and Opportunity to Submit Data, Views, or Arguments Re-
garding Proposed Trade Regulation Rule," 36 Fed. Reg. 1212 (Jan. 26, 1971).
112 See Discussion Record, Business Meeting of joint Industry/Government Task
Force, Feb. 17-18, 1970, at 5.
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those anxious to head off unfriendly federal initiatives. The June 17,
1970, meeting featured a factual status report on the phosphates prob-
lem made by representatives of the Council on Environmental Quality;
in addition, legislative options under consideration were outlined by
Secretary of Commerce Stans. The options included a punitive tax on
phosphate content and legislation allowing the federal government to
establish and enforce both content regulations for detergents and label-
ing requirements. A government spokesman noted that a "consensus
exists that [a] reduction in phosphate content or detergents would be
a beneficial move and [that such a reduction] should be a government
policy objective.""13 The consensus, however, did not include NIPCC's
industry membership, who went on record as being unanimously opposed
to legislation. The Sub-Council "took the position that the most impor-
tant steps for the Government to take now are to help speed the
adoption of techniques for treatment of effluent, rather than excluding
products from the markets." 114 In a little more than a year, the federal
government came around to the latter point of view.
No better opportunity for influencing the government was avail-
able to industry than NIPCC, an institution designed to invite influence
of the federal government. On July 14, 1970, Secretary Stans told a
press conference that the Detergents Sub-Council had met three or four
times and that he had attended most of the meetings.115 Unfortunately,
summary minutes are available for only a single meeting prior to that
date, a fact which indicates either that Mr. Stans' memory is poor or
that the Sub-Council members met from time to time without bothering
to go through the motions of complying with Executive Order 11007.
The latter possibility is indicative of the potential abuses of the indus-
try advisory process.
In October, 1970, came the first of two Detergents Sub-Council re-
ports, reportedly written by Procter & Gamble's Howard Morgens,
which indicated that "[a]s of this date the industry has reduced its
annual phosphate consumption by 100,000,000 pounds. ... ""' This
figure amounted to %5 of the problem, a pace which, barring setbacks,
would have resolved the phosphate detergent controversy by the year
2025. The Sub-Council also promised a six-fold increase in the rate of
reduction by early 1972 but, alas, there were setbacks. Nitrilociatetic
acid (NTA), which was to be the principal replacement material, fell
from favor in December of 1970, with disclosures that use of NTA in
preliminary experiments with test animals caused birth defects."17 The
113 Summary Minutes, Detergents Sub-Council Meeting, June 17, 1970, at 6.
114 Id. at 4.
115 Transcript of Press Briefing, Dep't of Commerce, July 14, 1970, at 9.
116 Status Report on Detergents, Detergents Sub-Council, Oct., 1970, at 6.
117 Status Report on Detergents, Detergents Sub-Council, Mar., 1971, at 11-12.
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record remained unclarified until a Sub-Council Status Report on De-
tergents was issued in March, 1971:
Some of the key portions of the earlier report consisted of
commitments and undertakings by the Industry to replace
certain stated amounts of phosphates with NTA. As the In-
dustry has promptly complied with the request of the Govern-
ment agencies to suspend the use of NTA, some of those
commitments are now rendered impossible of accomplishment
at an early date, and it is this which prompts this updating of
the 1970 report."'
Mr. Morgens and his colleagues on the Sub-Council could not
resist noting that the products the government was moving with all
deliberate speed to eliminate were not really deserving of elimination:
"Certainly there is no proof anywhere in the world that phosphate
reduction in detergents will eliminate the accelerated or excessive eutro-
phication."" 9 The report concluded that a lowering of phosphate
content without providing replacement materials would "mislead the
public," because
extensive experience indicates that there would then be a
strong tendency for women to increase the amount of the
detergent they use in order to achieve the same cleaning
results. By using a greater quantity of these detergents, the
housewife would be putting approximately the same amount of
phosphate into the environment as she does now-only at a
higher cost to herself.20
Within a year, Colgate-Palmolive and the FMC Corp. were prepared
to "mislead the public," when they began pushing for federal regula-
tion as a means of heading off stiffer local regulations.' 21
"Research and testing" was emphasized in NIPCC's October,
1970, publication discussing industry's "intensive" and prolonged re-
search effort aimed at "solving the problem of man-accelerated eutro-
phication."' 2 This effort involves "hundreds of scientists and millions
of dollars,"'2 3 although how many hundreds and how many millions
remains a well-kept trade secret. The research effort to find phosphate
118 Id. at 7.
119 Status Report on Detergents, Detergents Sub-Council, Oct., 1970, at 8.
120 Id. at 9-10.
121 See Statement by LeRoy H. Hurlbert, Colgate-Palmolive Co., Before the Sub-
comm. on Envronment of Senate Commerce Comm., Oct. 29, 1971, at 2; Statement of
Frederick A. Gilbert, FMC Corporation, id. at 9.
122 Status Report on Detergents, Detergents Sub-Council, Oct., 1970, at 12.
123 Id.
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replacements was said to be "by far the largest single research project
in the industry," 24 and, in support of this program, industry has im-
posed "no financial or manpower limits on investigation." 25 Working
hard to find a replacement for something that does not need to be
replaced apparently presents no paradox for detergent makers. Profes-
sional schizophrenia was quite evident when Colgate-Palmolive's Dr.
Richard B. Wearn told a House subcommittee in 1969 that the industry
was working "diligently" to come up with a phosphate substitute,120
while at the same time his company was working diligently to intro-
duce and promote "Punch," still another high phosphate detergent.12
In the end, politics, not research, proved decisive. Warning signs
foreshadowing the capitulation of the federal government appeared in
mid-1971. On July 2, a little noted press release was disseminated
under the heading "EPA Explains Position on Publication of Detergent
Lists."1 28 Consumers were now advised that a hard-hitting list of deter-
gent products and their percentage phosphate content, published by the
Federal Water Quality Administration in September, 1970, could "no
longer be considered as a reliable basis for comparison of products on
today's market. . . .The rate of introduction of new products and
reformulation of old products has become so rapid," the explanation
went, "that it is essentially impossible to prepare a list which doesn't
become obsolete almost as soon as it is published." This circumstance,
"coupled with the fact that some manufacturers now apparently
market products of differing composition for different geographic areas,
has led us to decide to refrain from publishing any further lists at this
time.') 29
On September 16, 1971, came a surprising announcement at a
press conference held by Surgeon General Jesse Steinfeld, FDA Com-
missioner Charles Edwards, CEQ's Russell Train and the EPA's Wil-
liam Ruckelshaus. The message was startling: in addition to continuing
uncertainty regarding NTA, the increasing use of "highly caustic sub-
stitutes" for phosphates in detergents was said to be a "cause for
serious concern." Phosphates were back in favor. The announcement
went to the extreme of urging states and localities "to reconsider laws
124 Id.
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and policies which unduly restrict the use of phosphates in deter-
gents."'130
In slavish detail, Administration spokesmen articulated the posi-
tion which the major manufacturers had consistently urged. Surgeon
General Steinfeld went so far as to declare: "My advice to the house-
wife at this time would be to use the phosphate detergent."' 3 ' Within
days, full-page Lever Brothers ads were paraphrasing the Surgeon Gen-
eral: "My advice to the housewife is to use phosphate detergents."' 32
No ads bothered to carry the Surgeon General's later concession that
several of the most caustic of detergents analyzed were phosphate-
based. 33 Mr. Ruckelshaus chimed in with a pledge to help local govern-
ments upgrade waste treatment facilities so that they would be capable
of handling phosphorus.134 A New York City official pointed out a few
weeks later that the federal government had come through with only
two percent of the funds obligated to improve the city's sewage treat-
ment facilities.' 35
As with the situation involving air pollution standards for smelters,
there is evidence that NIPCC has supplied invaluable inside-track op-
portunities for those who would redirect governmental policy concern-
ing the use of phosphorus in detergents. The decision to rehabilitate the
reputation of phosphorus had serious economic effects upon those who
had already made a substantial economic commitment to use replace-
ment materials. Once again, the evidence against NIPCC is circum-
stantial, since the written record of contacts between the government
and the industry during the crucial decision-making days is unavailable.
This dearth of hard evidence itself points to the need for procedural
reforms in the advisory mechanism.
IV. ADVICE FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Under present consideration by Congress and by the Office of
Management and the Budget (OMB) are proposals that would rework
the advisory process as it functions under NIPCC' 36 In light of this
activity, a long overdue modification of Executive Order 11007 is
virtually certain. The NIPCC experience also points the way to further
130 Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Press Release, Sept. 15, 1971, at 10.
131 Unofficial Transcript of September 15 Press Conference, Sept. 16, 1971, at 10.
132 See, e.g., Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 28, 1971, at C-12.
133 Statement Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate Commerce
Comm., Oct. 1, 1971, at 4.
134 Unofficial Transcript of September 15 Press Conference, Sept. 16, 1971, at 6.
135 Testimony of Jerome Kretchmer, New York City Environmental Protection
Administrator, Before Senate Commerce Comm., Oct. 1, 1971, at 4.
136 See, e.g., S. 2064, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ; Draft Executive Order: Prescribing
Regulations for the Formation, Management, Use and Termination of Committees in
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strictures on the activities of trade associations, whether or not they are
specifically invited to offer advice to the government.
A. The Proposed Changes in Executive Order 11007
If the NIPCC experience offers an abiding insight, it is that the
advisory committee process should be completely open, both to the
casual observer and to the serious investigator. Public access to these
proceedings should not remain a matter of discretion. Testimony before
congressional committees has revealed flagrant instances regarding the
denial of access to observers who sought entry to special interest ad-
visory groups.1a The argument proffered to justify the secrecy, that it
enhances the freedom of dialogue, should not override the risks in-
herent in ex parte submissions made to the regulators and exchanges
among competitors supervised only by the sympathetic. The further
claim that outsiders who would intrude can do so on their own time
and expense overlooks the tangible benefits afforded to those arriving
by invitation, such as the members of NIPCC. As we have seen, these
invitees are given the red-carpet treatment by policy makers bending
every effort to provide current information on research or planned
regulatory initiatives. It is decidedly more advantageous to learn about
pending research proposals from an agency's director of research than
it is from a public information officer.
One remedy to the problem could be a mandatory requirement
that public representatives be included on advisory committees. OMB
proposes "effective representation of the public, when appropri-
ate...,,"I" which is as noncommital as can be. Short of this, open meet-
ings should be required. OMB wisely advocates open meetings by pro-
posing that "any interested persons may attend meetings of advisory
committees..."'3 subject, of course, to logistical limitations.
For industry advisory committees, at least, and probably for all
advisory committees, the privilege to waive verbatim transcripts should
be eliminated. Tape recording the meetings could easily be accomplished
and public access to the verbatim record would guarantee the trust-
worthiness of summary minutes. These summary minutes should be
made available for general distribution to interested parties, which is
the present practice. OMB proposes, however, broad limitations that
would justify secrecy for the deliberations of government advisors if
their discussions touched on national security, international policy,
trade secrets, information concerning the competence or character of
187 See Hearings on Advisory Committees, Before the Senate Subcomm. on Inter-
governmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 209-33 (1970) (testimony of Ralph Nader).
188 Draft Executive Order, supra note 136, § 13(c).
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any individual, or information that "if prematurely released would be
detrimental to the public health or safety." 140 Without pausing to probe
these loopholes, suffice it to say that every exception jeopardizes the
policy of full disclosure in areas where, for practical purposes, ad-
ministrative fiat is the last word. One can rightly be skeptical about
what kind of trade secret it is that may be freely shared among com-
petitors but withheld from the public.
Other provisions in OMB's proposals also deserve brief comment.
It is presently the law, and it should remain so, that the agenda of an
advisory group should be prescribed by a government employee, and
that the meetings be conducted in his presence and adjourned at his
direction. It is also essential that an advisory group remain advisory,
unless Congress gives it a law-making function. OMB proposes to drop
entirely the special definition of industry advisory committee and, in
particular, the requirement that an industry committee be representative
in character. While it may be arguable whether the public should have
a seat on a special interest advisory committee, there is no room for
the claim that the special interest should not be fairly representative.
These and other indicated deficiencies suggest that Congress should
legislate in this sensitive area, instead of deferring to a newly-aroused
OMB whose concern about advisory committees became more pro-
nounced as congressional hearings progressed. 141
B. Further Reporting Obligations for Trade Associations
The NIPCC experience raises more questions about what has gone
on outside the advisory committee process, than it does about what has
transpired within it. In the policy issues raised before the NIPCC
sub-councils, trade associations have played an important, although not
explicit, role. As observers at the meetings, collectors of data for com-
mittee reports, reviewers of the finished products, and architects of
policy initiatives, the role of the trade association official has been ob-
vious though ill-defined. The trade association's research and lobbying
role is critical when environmental concerns of industry-wide signif-
icance arise. In industry after industry it is clear that the trade associa-
tion coordinates research activities which measure the polluting impact
of a technology and the costs, prospects, or need for change. The
Smelter Control Research Association is a prime example of the joint-
research practice now quite popular. Similarly, the Executive Order
creating NIPCC explicitly sanctions common responses to regulatory
initiatives of the type condemned in the smog conspiracy decree and
discouraged by the head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
140 Id. § 15(f)(3).
141 See 1971 Hearings on Advisory Committees, supra note 126, at 517-37 (testimony
of Arnold Weber).
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ment. In this context, it is not surprising that uneasiness about the anti-
trust laws is a regular concern of industrial lobbyists dealing in environ-
mental matters.
One measure which might remove doubt concerning the legality of
trade association activity in areas of research and political influence
could be implemented by rejuvinating the timeworn proposals requiring
full disclosure of trade association activities. Thirty years ago one
writer found it "impossible to measure the extent to which members
of trade associations are actually engaged in cooperating to serve the
public and in conspiring against it."' 42 He saw no "assurance" against
a conspiracy "unless an agent of the Federal Government is placed in
every trade association office to read all correspondence, memoranda,
and reports, attend all meetings, listen to all conversations, participate
in all the merriment and diversion, and issue periodic reports on what
transpires." ' The leading hornbook on trade association law today
coyly reports: "Trade association and company counsel are working
together with increasing frequency to assure complete compliance with
the antitrust laws.... Perhaps the two, working with enlightened com-
pany and association personnel, have obviated any need for placing
'an agent of the Federal Government . .. in every association of-
fice .... ,'1" And perhaps they have not.
Over the years, stiff proposals have been aimed at trade associa-
tions. As indicated earlier, Milton Handler, one of the deans of antitrust
scholarship, years ago recommended that trade associations should be
required to register with a public authority, and to make periodic re-
ports of their activities. Their operations, he said, "should be completely
in the open."145 To implement this policy, he suggested that "[t]rade
associations should also be required to keep a complete stenographic
record of their proceedings at all regular and special meetings." 40 The
wisdom of this proposal was recognized by the Temporary National
Economic Committee in 1941, which recommended the registration of
trade associations and the disclosure of their activities. 47
CONCLUSION
The President set out to encourage voluntary initiatives and to
invite industry opinions on governmental policy when he established
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a National Industrial Pollution Control Council, consisting of top exec-
utives from the nation's major industries. Both objectives were achieved,
although the record raises serious questions regarding the role played
by the advisory committee in the formation of public policy. Ex parte
decision-making is not to be applauded, as the case histories suggest.
The enduring lesson of the National Industrial Pollution Control Coun-
cil should provide the touchstone for reform: when members of an
industry set out to influence their government, they should be required
to do so publicly.
